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A SHARED CONSTITUTIONALISM: STEM




These have been hard times for the Transatlantic alliance.' One has come
to expect rough patches in Franco-American relations, but the policies of the
second Bush Presidency, 2 clashing with Chancellor Schr der's anti-war re-
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1. See The Transatlantic Alliance: A Creaking Partnership, THE ECONOMIST, June
5, 2004 at 22-24. See also Michael Cox, Europe and the New American Challenge After
September 11: Crisis - What Crisis?, I(IS) J. TRANSATLANTIC 37 (2003) (containing an
extensive catalogue of journal and newspaper headlines and titles of speeches and
remarks from hearings chronicling the tension); Craig Smith, New Transatlantic Tension
and the Kagan Phenomenon: A Primer, 4 GERMAN L. J. 863 (2003), available at
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf[Vol04/pdf vol 04 no 09.pdf. Ian Black says that
the healing has not yet begun. Ian Black, The Transatlantic Drift, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED,
Sept. 20, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/joumalist/story/0,, 1 308768,00.html.
2. The trend toward conflict was set well before the war with Iraq, based on the
Bush Administration's approach to issues like the Kyoto Protocol and the International
Criminal Court. See Thorsten Schulz, Restoring Checks and Balances: A Panacea for
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election campaign in 2002, 3 have seemingly plunged relations between the
United States and Germany, stalwart Cold War allies, into crisis as well.
4
For some, the "grosser Teich" ("big pond," as many Germans were once
fond of referring to the Atlantic Ocean) is looking more oceanic by the day.
5
No one has insisted upon the widening gulf as clamorously as Robert
Kagan of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.6  But this
impression is wrong for at least two reasons. First, and most significantly,
because it depends upon the gulf that has opened up between the U.S. and
Germany on a number of policy issues, which are subject to shifts in the
popular mood, while neglecting more fundamental commonalities. Second,
the Transatlantic Relationship? 9-10 (Am. Inst. for Contemp. German Stud., Working
Paper, 2003), available at http://www.aicgs.org/Publications/PDF/schultz.pdf;
However, it was the rise of George W. Bush in 2000, which really set the
proverbial cat amongst the political pigeons, and within months of his
contested election serious commentators were wondering whether or not the
two sides [of the Transatlantic alliance] were at last heading for divorce....
Europeans and Americans seemed to be disagreeing on nearly every issue of
international importance-from climate warming to arms control.
Cox, supra note 1, at 41; Michaela C. Hertkorn, Why German-US Relations Still Matter
to the Transatlantic Alliance 8 (Dtisseldorf Inst. for Foreign and Security Policy,
Working Paper No. 7, 2004), available at http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/hem07/Hem07.pdf
("The continuing flare up of German anti-Bush-anti-Americanism in news seemed to put
German in confrontation with the US already back in July and August 2001 .").
3. Hertkorn, supra note 2, at 11.
4. See, e.g., Is It Rejection or Seduction, ECONOMIST, July 31, 2004, at 45-46 (citing
a survey by the Allensbach Institute that found Germans have increasingly negative
views of Americans); Mr. Schroder Goes to Washington, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 2004 ("But
American-German relations, while improved, are still rather wooden.").
5. Thorsten Schulz assumes, almost without comment, the fact of the disrepair from
which the transatlantic relationship must be rescued in his AICGS/DAAD Working
Paper. Thorsten Schulz, Restoring the Checks and Balances: A Panacea for the
Transatlantic Relationship? 1 (Am. Inst. for Contemp. German Stud., Working Paper,
2003), available at http://www.aicgs.org/Publications/PDF/schultz.pdf. The divergence
of policy and perception between the U.S. and Europe is confirmed by the German
Marshall Fund and the Compagnia di San Paolo. See Transatlantic Trends Overview:
2005, http://www.transatlantictrends.org (last visited Feb. 19, 2006). The survey also
recognizes the complexities that operate to make generalizations about the Transatlantic
alliance difficult. Id.
6. ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER 1 (2003) ("It is time to stop
pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even
that they occupy the same world.").
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this conclusion relies upon a willful blindness to the comparative sample that
gives it force.7
As to the first critique, Kagan and many other commentators seem
persuaded that divergence and disagreement over policy and in popular
culture are adequate measures of the rot that has supposedly gotten into the
Transatlantic alliance. Thus, the death penalty, gun ownership and social
welfare come in for consideration. So, too, does the popularity of Michael
Moore in Europe.8 Of course, the Iraq war is the policy agenda dejour that
serves as the definitive diagnostic device leading to the conclusion that the
United States and Germany are drifting apart.
With respect to the second critique, in remarking upon the dramatic
differences between the United States and Europe, Transatlantic pessimists
do not dwell on the determinative character of their self-selected
comparative sample. But the dissimilarities between the United States and
Europe fade from nearly any other comparative perspective. What if, for
example, the focus shifted away from distinctions within the Transatlantic
alliance (including the United States and Germany9) to a consideration of the
distinctions between the Transatlantic alliance and (perhaps more
appropriate for today's geopolitical climate) the Arab world?
Human stem cell research, the focus of the present proceedings, simply
adds grist to this mill. Taking the United States and Germany, one finds
totally dichotomous policies. The United States liberally permits the
practice and only imposes restrictions on the availability of federal funds for
projects involving human stem cell research.' 0 Germany, on the other hand,
which only recently softened its comprehensive ban on the practice, still
7. See Russell Miller, The Shared Transatlantic Jurisprudence of Dignity, 4
GERMAN L.J. 925, 925-26 (2003), available at http://www.germanlawjoumal.com/pdf/
Vol04No09/PDFVol 04 No 09 925-934 SI Miller.pdf.
8. A recent Deutsche Welle article compares Michael Moore's popularity in
Germany with that of Jerry Lewis in France. See The German Cult of Michael Moore,
DEUTSCHE WELLE, at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1006907,00.html. Michael
Moore's sales in Germany are staggering: in the first year of sales for Stupid White Men,
1.1 million copies were sold in Germany as compared to 630,000 in United States.
Stephen Zeitchik, Michael Moore: The New JFK?, PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY.COM, Oct. 27,
2003, available at http://www.publishersweekly.com/article/CA331744.html?pubdate= 10
%2F27%2F2003&display=archive.
9. Not to mention the degrees of divergence within the Transatlantic alliance that
undermine the coherence of Kagan's comparative sample. Consider, for example, "red"
and "blue" America or "old" and "new" Europe.
10. See, generally, Kara L. Belew, Stem Cell Division: Abortion Law and its
Influence on the Adoption of Radically Different Embryonic Stem Cell Legislation in the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, 39 TEX. INT'L L. J. 479 (2004).
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tightly regulates the limited exception to that ban.11  Accepting the
respective policies on this issue as exceptionally indicative of the state of the
Transatlantic alliance, it would seem to be difficult to dispute that, in
considering the United States and Germany today, we are talking about
countries as different as "Mars and Venus."
12
I beg to differ. Underlying the countries' diametrical approaches toward
human stem cell research is a shared brand of liberal constitutionalism that
transcends matters of malleable policy. 13 I believe that an examination of
this fundamental common ground is a better test of the firmness of the
foundations of Transatlanticism. Ironically, Kagan seems to agree: "[a]fter
all, it is more than a clich6 that the United States and Europe share a set of
common Western beliefs. Their aspirations for humanity are much the
same, even if their vast disparity of power has now put them in very
different places.' 4
In this paper, I argue that the tensions plaguing the Transatlantic alliance,
and the intensity of the alarm they have triggered, are overblown.
Washington and Berlin may not see exactly eye-to-eye these days, but
Americans and Germans occupy decidedly the same world.'" This
conclusion rests on my examination of a shared Transatlantic
constitutionalism, as exemplified by probable United States and German
constitutional responses to human stem cell research. A constitutional
analysis of this issue does not support the conclusion that "the United States
and Europe are fundamentally different today."' 6 To the contrary, it reveals
that, even on an issue for which they reach such conflicting conclusions, the
United States and Germany have the most important things in common.
11. Id.
12. KAGAN, supra note 6, at 3.
13. See Belew, supra note 10.
14. KAGAN, supra note 6, at 103.
15. Contra KAGAN, supra note 6, at 3 ("It is time to stop pretending that European
and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same
world.").
16. Id., at 6.
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A SHARED CONSTITUTIONALISM
I. CONSTITUTIONALISM AS THE APPROPRIATE MEASURE OF
TRANSATLANTICISM
A. Constitutionalism
Louis Henkin notes that "Constitutionalism is nowhere defined," but he
has produced a catalogue of the key elements of constitutionalism as a
principle of social construction. 17 Henkin proposes that constitutionalism
consists of "popular sovereignty," a "prescriptive... blueprint," "government
ruled by law and governed by democratic principles," "limited government,"
"respect [for] individual rights," and "institutions to monitor and assure
respect for the constitutional blueprint."' 18 Daniel Lev gives us a related, if
more succinct, description: "political process, with or without a written
constitution, is more or less oriented to public rules and institutions intended
to define and contain the exercise of political authority. At the core of
constitutionalism is legal process."'19  Lev's characterization of
constitutionalism proves incredibly important in the context in which we are
operating, namely the rarefied fields implicated by the debate over human
stem cell research: morality, medicine and the conceptualization of life
itself. One might be inclined to believe that such matters are better left to
other institutions, like a society's religious or scientific communities, but
societies operating under constitutionalism channel them towards the law.
17. Louis Henkin, A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic
Defects, in CONSTFTUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY 39 (Michel
Rosenfeld ed., 1994).
18. Id. at 40-42.
19. Daniel S. Lev, Social Movements, Constitutionalism and Human Rights:
Comments From the Malaysian and Indonesian Experiences, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 139 (Douglas Greenberg, et
al. eds., 1993). See Michel Rosenfeld, Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay Between
Identity and Diversity, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY,
supra note 17, at 3 ("[1In the broadest terms, modem constitutionalism requires imposing
limits on the powers of government, adherence to the rule of law, and the protection of
fundamental rights.").
A Shared Constitutionalism
The fact that the debate will be subject to legal (constitutional) resolution
necessarily determines a society's approach to the debate.
20
Alongside this structural and political content, constitutionalism also
draws a map of a polity, which necessarily embraces "identity and
difference." 2 1 Michel Rosenfeld explains that "constitutionalism only makes
sense in relation to sociopolitical settings that can be construed as revolving
around the two opposite poles of identity, and diversity or difference." 22 A
too homogenous community will not require the structural and political
safeguards secured by constitutionalism. At the same time, a too diverse
community cannot be maintained such safeguards. This facet of
constitutionalism is also essential to the debate over human stem cell
research. The polarized state of the debate exemplifies both the strength of
the differences hemmed in by American and German constitutionalism, just
as the parties' engagement in the debate reveals the identity confirmed by
American and German constitutionalism.
The last point necessarily leads to the next. Because constitutionalism
serves as a proxy for a particular community's unique dynamism and
tension, constitutions, and the high court interpretations of them, are a far
better measure of the nature of a particular community than are the policies
pursued by a given moment's majority. The very nature of constitutionalism
is to lock away the fundamental values of a society, secure from the
buffeting whim of the majority. In this sense, to look into a constitution is to
look into the heart of a society. 23 Not only will policy approaches to issues
like human stem cell research come to be measured against the constitution
20. "Religious, aristocratic, military, or charismatic regimes, whatever their
constitutional or other overlay, imply quite different orientations with other institutional
arrangements and legitimating ideologies." Lev, supra note 19, at 140.
21. Rosenfeld, supra note 19, at 4.
22. Id.
23. Lev explains:
Because the political contentions that bracket constitutionalist demands are
local matters, fed by local issues, interests, values, and historical
circumstances, the outcomes (constitutionalist or not in whatever measure)
are comprehensible essentially only in local terms. Neither constitutions nor
constitutionalism can be transferred. The point should be obvious, but is
often obscured by proprietary claims to the correct model. The dimensions of
French constitutionalism are not altogether clear to Americans or to Japanese,
the Indian or Norwegian cases seem odd anywhere else, and so on because
the political compromises worked out historically, the tacit social and
economic agreements made along the way, the play of local habit and values
and cultural assumptions, the ways in which change proceeds, are all taken
for granted at home but are unfathomable away.
Lev, supra note 19, at 141.
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in a reactive process (if they are called into question, as the difference
inherent in constitutionalism promises) but constitutionalism also
proactively shapes the community. Larry Siedentop brilliantly captures this
creative function of constitutionalism:
Thus, by influencing the way in which we conceive of our own
interests, and by providing a kind of chart or road map which
organizes a particular social landscape, constitutions enter into our
very souls. They help us to frame intentions and to act.
As we have seen, there are some respects in which liberal
constitutions have a fundamental impact on citizens' lives and
mark out borders on the maps of their personal identity.
Constitutions have this potential of creating provinces in the
mind. 24
Whatever the policy differences that emerge between the United States
and Germany on the issue of human stem cell research, their shared
constitutionalism says much more about the likely endurance of their
relationship. Because of this shared constitutionalism, the United States and
Germany have fundamental political structures and values in common. One
such common structure is the rejection of absolutism; constitutionalism
means that both societies are likely to employ a method in resolving a
socially divisive issue like human stem cell research in a manner that does
not wholly satisfy either side in the debate.
B. Difficulties as Regards the Stem Cell Issue
Human stem cell research is neither easily nor reliably susceptible to
comparative constitutional mapping of the kind I propose to undertake here,
both because the United States and German constitutions are silent on the
specific question and because neither country's constitutional court has, as2 5
yet, addressed the issue directly.- The best one can do is refer, by analogy,
to similar (but admittedly distinguishable) decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Bundesverfassungsgericht interpreting what we think might be the
relevant provisions of the respective constitutions. This is, of course, not all
guesswork. We can know, with some level of certainty, which constitutional
provisions and precedents will be implicated by (an eventual) stem cell case
before these courts. We must admit from the beginning, however, that this
effort is fraught with some degree of imprecision.
24. LARRY SIEDENTOP, DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE 96-97 (2000).
25. GERMAN NATIONAL ETHICS COUNCIL, OPINION ON THE IMPORT OF HUMAN
EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS 7 (2001), available at http://www.ethikrat.org/_english/
publications/stem cells/Opinion_l mport-HESC.pdf [hereinafter GERMAN NATIONAL
ETHICS COUNCIL].
A Shared Constitutionalism
The field into which one is most reasonably drawn by this imperfect
exercise in analogy is the field of abortion rights, which also raises the
specter of the constitutional protection of life and human dignity. This field
also has the additional merit of presenting similarly dichotomous United
States and German policies,26 thus providing an opportunity to test the thesis
that, in spite of these differences, one finds more meaningful similarities in
an examination of the constitutional method brought to bear on the issue. It
must be emphasized, however, that for all that abortion and human stem cell
research may have in common, they are not the same juridical issue and the
analogy has its limits. In fact, as will prove central to my discussion below,
very different constitutional interests are in conflict in the stem cell and
abortion contexts.
There are other lines of constitutional jurisprudence that might, by
analogy, inform this comparative constitutional analysis of human stem cell
research. Each, however, proves more imperfect than the abortion analogy.
For example, the "life" and "dignity" issues raised by the death penalty
differ significantly from those raised by human stem cell research because
the death penalty involves a threat to those constitutional values originating
with the state (as executioner) and not a private actor (whether a pregnant
woman and her doctor in the abortion context, or a scientific researcher in
the stem cell context).27 Some might also argue that the death penalty
should be distinguished because it does not involve a question of "innocent"
life. The "life" and "dignity" issues raised by the "death with dignity"
debate also differ significantly from those raised by human stem cell
26. See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 336 (2d ed. 1997) (German abortion jurisprudence
"stands in sharp contrast to the doctrinal analysis contained the American case of Roe v.
Wade."); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
310 (1994) ("The critical case was the famous 1975 abortion decision, which produced a
result the polar opposite of that our Supreme Court had reached two years earlier in Roe
v. Wade:.). Kara Belew recognizes both the usefulness of the analogy to abortion
jurisprudence and the divergent U.S. and German responses to the abortion issue:
The United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany are nations with
relatively similar institutions, political ideologies, religions, and marketplace
forces. Yet, these nations have enacted radically different legislation in
responding to the same basic questions: When does life begin? How should
science and morality interact? Is it ethically permissible to destroy a developing
human life in order to spare another? The difference between these nations in
their recently enacted ES cell legislation is largely reflective of divergent
historical legacies with respect to the legal permissibility and social
acceptability of abortion.
Belew, supra note 10, at 481.
27. For a discussion of the similarities in U.S. and German death penalty
jurisprudence see, Miller, supra note 7.
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research in that physician-assisted suicide is typically seen as a consensual
act.
Thus, in the absence of Supreme Court and Bundesverfassungsgericht
decisions on point, I will be analogizing to those courts' abortion
jurisprudence to make my case about a shared constitutionalism, and a
common constitutional method, that would likely prevail in the context of
human stem cell research, whatever distinct result the two systems might
reach on the question. I call this common constitutional method
"constitutional balancing." It is the interpretive method employed by the
constitutional courts of the United States and Germany in resolving the
abortion issue. Importantly, it requires these courts to reject absolutist
claims regarding competing constitutional interests.
II. A SHARED CONSTITUTIONAL METHOD-BALANCING
A. Balancing as a Method of Constitutional Interpretation
I teach my students that constitutional law is really only "constitutional
reading., 28  Constitutions typically are cast in general terms,29 and thus,
constitutionalism as a principle of social organization is infused with
interpretive method and doctrine. American and German constitutional
adjudicators rely on a shared set of "interpretive constraints,, 30 including,
inter alia, textualism, originalism, and structuralism. 31 They also frequently
seek to balance competing constitutional interests as a method for giving
their respective constitutions meaning.32 T. Alexander Aleinikoff explains
28. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, I AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 32 (§ 1-12) (3rd ed.
2000) ("There is, of course, always the need to face, here as elsewhere, the ordinary
problems of reading: issues of ambiguity, vagueness, obscurity, and the like.").
29. NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 139 (2003).
30. Id.
31. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189-1190 (1987); PHILIP BOBBiTr,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); Winfried Brugger, Legal Interpretation, Schools of
Jurisprudence, and Anthropology: Some Remarks from a German Point of View, 42 AM.
J. COMp. L. 395 (1994); KOMMERS, supra note 26, at 40-49.
32. The authors of the casebook Comparative Constitutionalism include a section on
balancing in the book's chapter on "Constitutional Interpretation." DORSEN ET AL., supra
note 29, at 196-198, 207-211. Aleinikoff cites the following, from a broad range of areas
of the law, as among the leading examples of the Supreme Court's balancing
jurisprudence: Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (commerce clause);
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938) (intergovernmental immunities); Minersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (civil liberties); Schneider v. States, 308
U.S. 147 (1939) (free speech). In German constitutional law balancing draws on the
A Shared Constitutionalism
that balancing, as a method of constitutional reasoning, involves
"identification, valuation, and comparison of competing interests," by
"identifying interests implicated by the case and [reaching] a decision or
[constructing] a rule of constitutional law by explicitly or implicitly
assigning values to the identified interests.
33
Balancing, as a constitutional method, is particularly responsive to the
tensions and polarity inherent in constitutionalism. 34 It facilitates the fact
that constitutional dispute resolution necessarily must have the effect that
one party will be disadvantaged by a decision, but it permits the
constitutional adjudicator to actualize the competing interests implicated by
the dispute. Thus, the question is not whether one interest is so predominant
that it wholly supersedes the other, but whether one of two fully viable
interests outweighs the other because, in the circumstances, it is more
compelling or more important than the other. Aleinikoff explains: "One
interest does not override another; each survives and is given its due."
35
This method distinctly rejects Dworkin's absolutist understanding of the
rights secured by a constitution, 36 precisely the view that a society's interest
groups typically hold of the rights they assert. This, of course, is nowhere
more clear than in the polarized debates over abortion and human stem cell
research.
Aleinikoff is critical of the dominance balancing has obtained in
American constitutional law: "Balancing has turned us away from the
Constitution, supplying 'reasonable' policymaking in lieu of theoretical
investigations of rights, principles and structures." 37 Still, he recognizes that
tradition of Interessenjurisprudenz (interest-oriented jurisprudence) in statutory
interpretation and finds formal fulfillment in the Grundsatz der Verhdltnismdssigkeit
(principle of proportionality), which provides that allowable infringements upon
individual rights must nonetheless be proportional. The third element of the principle of
proportionality requires that the challenged state action "outweigh the individual's
interest, i.e. basic right on balance." NIGEL FOSTER & SATISH SULE, GERMAN LEGAL
SYSTEMS AND LAWS 170-172 (3r' ed. 2002). See BVerfGE 30, 1; 35, 202 (Lebach Case);
KOMMERS, supra note 26, at 46-48; CURRIE, supra note 26, at 20. The Grundgesetz
explicitly incorporates the doctrine of balancing in determining compensation for the
expropriation of property: "Such compensation shall be determined by establishing an
equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected." Article
14.3 GG.
33. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.
J. 943, 945 (1987).
34. See Rosenfeld, supra note 19.
35. Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 946.
36. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
37. Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 1004. Balancing has its defenders. See Steven H.
Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA
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some such process must be a part of any practical legal system. 38 A similar
ambivalence can be found in the German scholarly literature on balancing.
The method continues to come in for widespread acceptance, 39 but Karl-
Heinz Ladeur recently published Kritik der Abwdgung in der
Grundrechtsdogmatik (Critique of Balancing in Fundamental Rights
Dogma) in which he rejects balancing as a standardless treatment of
constitutional provisions meant to free the state from its role as the
antagonist of fundamental rights.
40
B. Balancing in the Abortion Rights and (by analogy) the Stem Cell Debate
The struggle to balance the constitutional interests in conflict in the
abortion rights context has come to dominate the jurisprudence. This is true
of the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v.
Casey;41 and it is every bit as true of the Bundesverfassungsgericht's
Abortion I and Abortion II decisions. 42 Balancing might have been the only
viable approach to a constitutional dispute fueled by inconsistent, intensely
asserted constitutional interests. As Laurence Tribe explains, "[t]he
constitutional quandary presented by abortion involves two central
questions. First, what precisely is the right that is at stake for the pregnant
woman? Second, how is that right to be balanced against the interest in
preserving unborn life?"
43
L. REv. 915 (1978); Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation:
Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REv. 1212 (1983).
38. Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 943.
39. See, e.g., Udo di Fabio, Grundrechte als Wertordnung, 59 JURISTENZEITUNG 1
(2004); Bernhard Schlink, Der Grundsatz der Verhaltnismassigkeit, in FESTSCHRIFT 50
JAHRE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICTH 445 (Peter Badura and Horst Dreier eds., 2001);
Peter Lerche, Grundrecthsschranken, in 5 HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS, 775 (Josef
Isensee and Paul Kirchhofeds., 2d ed. 2001).
40. KARL-HEINZ LADEUR, KRITIK DER ABWAGUNG IN DER GRUNDRECHTSDOGMATIK
(2004).
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
42. BVerfGE 39, 1 translated in DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 336-346 (2d ed. 1997);
BVerflGE 88, 203, translated in DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 349-355 (2d. ed. 1997).
43. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1352 (2d ed 1988).
A Shared Constitutionalism
1. Balancing and Abortion in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court's opinions in Roe and Casey are archetypal examples
of the balancing method in constitutionalism, both as a distinct literary style
and as an approach to the substantive meaning of the constitution.
44
As a substantive matter of constitutional law, in Roe, Justice Blackmun's
majority of the Supreme Court sought to strike a balance between a
woman's Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy and a State's interest in
protecting the potential life of a fetus.45 Others also have characterized the
Supreme Court's substantive effort in Roe as an act of balancing:
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe examined two state interests,
protecting the life and health of the mother and protecting
potential life, and balanced them against the woman's right to
privacy and autonomy. In implementing that balancing process,
Justice Balckmun described how he believed the state's interests
change while the woman's interest remains constant during the
gestation period.46
Justice Blackmun's majority considered the weight of the competing
interests implicated by abortion at distinct points in a pregnancy, with the
now well-known conclusion that the woman's privacy interests were to be
given precedence prior to fetal viability and that during this period the
woman is "free to determine, without regulation by the State, that... [her]
pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment
may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State. 47 After
fetal viability, Justice Blackmun's majority found that the balance tilts in
favor of the State's interest in potential life and the State "may go so far as
to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother." 48 Nineteen years later, in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe's essential holding.
44. "The new form of opinion writing [balancing] was more than a change in literary
style, it reflected a new way of looking at constitutional law influenced by almost half a
century of ferment in legal philosophy." Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 954.
45. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. The Court based a woman's right to privacy in the
Fourteenth Amendment and not the Ninth Amendment. Id. The right is found among the
substantive due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.
46. Alan Brownstein & Paul Dau, The Constitutional Morality of Abortion, 33 B.C.
L. REV. 689, 745-47 (1992) (emphasis added). E.g., Laurence Tribe, Foreword: Toward
a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973) ("The
Court purports to be balancing the 'relative weights of the respective interests involved'
in abortion.") (citations omitted).
47. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
48. Id. at 163, 164.
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From the opening section of his opinion in Roe, Justice Blackmun made
use of balancing terminology and metaphors. He described the Court's task
as being one of "constitutional measurement, ' '49 and he summariy
dispatched the absolutist claims for the rights implicated by the case.
Characterizing the work of the Court as a matter of "weighing" and not the
discernment and actualization of absolutist constitutional values, Justice
Blackmun cast the matter as a set of scales on which the qualified right to
personal privacy would be "considered against important state interests in
regulation." 51 The weights on the scales were then adjusted according to the
"compelling," "important," or "legitimate" nature of the respective interests
at distinct points in a pregnancy.
The plurality opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter in Casey
did nothing to disturb the balancing method that had guided Justice
Blackmun's decision in Roe. In fact, by weighing the pre-viability right to
an abortion against the regulatory expression of a State's "substantial
interest in potential life," the plurality reinvigorated the role of balancing in
this line of jurisprudence. The plurality explicitly placed the implicated
interests on the scales at all points in a pregnancy, thereby disposing as
formalistic the criticisms of Roe that viewed Justice Blackmun's reliance on
52fetal viability as the trigger for the State's interest in potential life. As
Justice Blackmun had done in Roe, the Casey 3plurality unambiguously
rejected absolutist claims for the interests at stake. The plurality opinion in
49. Id. at 116.
50. Id. at 154 ("The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be
absolute.").
51. Id. at 154.
52. Aleinikoff joins these critics, concluding that Justice Blackmun "set up [the]
constitutional problem in balancing terms, but [decided] the case without actually
balancing... the Court [sent up] smoke, supplying words that look like a balance, but in
fact are something quite different... [Justice Blackmun's 'weighing' really amounted to]
a definition of viability, not an explanation of value." Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 976.
See KoMMERS, supra note 26, at 336 ("the doctrinal analysis contained in the American
case of Roe v. Wade.") (citation omitted). I disagree with this characterization of Justice
Blackmun's opinion. Although I argue that the plurality opinion in Casey is more
thorough about balancing the competing interests in privacy and life, I do not read Roe as
being absolutist regarding the right to privacy in the pre-viability context. I rather agree
with Laurence Tribe that: "Underlying the result in Roe v. Wade is a conviction that the
safety and liberty of a life in being are of greater constitutional value than the protection
of a nonviable fetal life." TRIBE, supra note 43, at 1358 (emphasis added). Justice
Blackmun clearly concluded that fetal claims "to society's compassion and sustenance-
like the claims of infants, indigents, and the infirm--are powerful both morally and
legally," but that, on balance, they are outweighed by the privacy interests of women. Id.
53. "Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow that the States is entitled to
proscribe it in all instances." Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (emphasis added).
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Casey also is littered with the terminology and metaphors of balancing. On
seven occasions the plurality characterized the constitutional work in which
it was engaged as a matter of "weighing." 54 And again, the plurality found
that balancing exercise affected by the "substantial," "compelling," or
"important" character of the respective interests.
2. Balancing and Abortion in the Bundesverfassungsgericht
The Bundesverfassungsgericht's adoption of the balancing method in the
abortion context is somewhat more surprising considering the fact that the
Court has interpreted the fundamental rights in the Grundgesetz as forming a
hierarchy of rights in which those at the top categorically trump those below
them. Nonetheless, Donald Kommers sees the Court's Abortion I and
Abortion II decisions as "attempts to balance" conflicting rights secured by
the constitution.55 At issue were the constitution's provisions securing
human dignity 56 and the right to life, 57 on one hand, and a woman's right to
autonomy and the free development of her personality, 58 on the other.
Confronting these contending interests, the Bundesverfassungsgericht
concluded that "the Basic Law also protects the life developing within the
mother's womb as an independent legal interest" beginning on the
fourteenth day after conception. 59 The Court then established the "supreme
value" to be attached to human life in the German constitutional order.
60
54. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853, 855, 871, 896, 917, 976, and
982 (1992).
55. KOMMERS, supra note 26, at 336 and 347 ("The German distinction between fetal
life and persons is noteworthy in comparative perspective because it allowed the
Constitutional Court to engage in a balancing process largely absent in the seminal
American case of Roe v. Wade.") (citation omitted).
56. Art. 1.1 GG ("Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall
be the duty of all state authority.").
57. Art. 2.2 GG ("Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity.").
58. Art. 2.1 GG ("Every person shall have the right to free development of his
personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the
constitutional order or the moral law.").
59. BVerfGE 39, 1 (36), translated in DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 336-346 (2d ed. 1997).
60. Id. The Court based this valuation on the "categorical inclusion of the inherently
self-evident right to life in the Basic Law," a departure from the Weimar Constitution that
the Court explained principally as a reaction to the 'destruction of life unworthy to live,'
the 'final solution,' and the 'liquidations' that the National Socialist regime carried out as
governmental measures. Article 2.2(1) of the Basic Law implies, as does the real of the
death penalty by Article 102 of the Basic Law, 'an affirmation of the fundamental value
of human life and of a state concept which emphatically opposes the views of a political
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The Court did not dismiss the woman's interest in self-determination, 6 1 but
found that it fails to match the great weight to be assigned to the fetus's life:
[T]his right is not given without limitation-the rights of others,
the constitutional order, and moral law limit it. [The right to
personality] can never confer a priori the authority to intrude upon
the protected legal sphere of another... much less the authority to
destroy [this sphere] as well as a life.... No compromise is
possible.... Pursuant to the principle of carefully balancing
competing constitutionally protected positions,... [the state] must
give the protection of the unborn child's life priority.
62
Significantly, the Court explicitly characterized its method as a matter of
balancing. This seems to have obliged the Court to acknowledge that some
range of circumstances might occur in which the "unborn's right to life may
place a substantially greater burden on the woman than that normally
connected with a pregnancy [and according to which it had conducted its
original weighing of the interests]. 63  In these circumstances, the Court
found that the scale would tip back towards the woman's constitutional
interest in autonomy, as measured by the reasonableness of requiring a
woman to "continue her pregnancy" in the face of grave injury to her health
or "other cases where pregnancy would subject the woman to extraordinary
burdens... [including]... eugenic, ethical (criminological), and social
[considerations] .64
The Court again applied the balancing method in the Abortion H case,
explaining its effort in these terms: "The scope of the duty to protect the
unborn is to be determined by weighing its importance and need for
protection against the conflicting interests of other objects deserving of legal
protection." In its Abortion H decision the Court explicitly recognized that
the balancing method it had brought to bear on the abortion question
necessarily required a rejection of an absolutist approach to the fetus's right
to life. The consequence of this balancing approach was, of course, implicit
in the "unreasonable burden" exception the Court had outlined in Abortion T
In Abortion I the Court explained:
regime for which the individual life had little significance and which therefore practiced
unlimited abuse in the name of the arrogated right over life and death of the citizen.
Id. at (36, 37).
61. Id. at (43). ("It is true that the right of a woman freely to develop her personality
also lays claim to recognitions and protection.").
62. Id (emphasis added).
63. Id. at (48).
64. Id. at (49).
65. BVerfGE 88, 203 (203), translated in DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 349-355 (2d.
ed. 1997).
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But since the Basic Law does not elevate the protection of the
[unborn] life above all other legal values, the right [of the unborn]
to life is not absolute. It is not elevated above all other legal
values without exception; this is clear from Article 2.2.... Rather,
the scope of the state's duty to protect the unborn is to be
determined by weighing its importance and need for protection
against other conflicting legal values. The legal values affected by
the right to life of the unborn include the woman's right to
protection and respect for her own dignity (Article 1.1), the rights
to life and physical integrity, and the right to personal
development (Article 2.1 ).66
The Court unequivocally reasserted the unborn's right to life as the
superior value, but it also more clearly asserted that this right, on balance,
"does not extend to the point of eliminating all of the woman's legal rights
[to self-determination]."
3. Balancing and Stem Cells
Again, noting the limits of the analogy between the stem cell and abortion
questions, I expect the Supreme Court and the Bundesverfassungsgeright
would employ the balancing method of constitutional method to which each
court resorted in the abortion context if they were to consider a challenge to
the constitutionality of human stem cell research.68 This would especially be
the case if each of the contending interests in the dispute succeeded in
characterizing their position as the assertion of a distinct constitutional right.
Beyond suggesting this common constitutional method, the analogy to the
abortion jurisprudence of the two courts breaks down. Most significantly,
human stem cell research does not implicate the compelling constitutional
interest in a woman's right to privacy or autonomy, particularly as animated
by gender equality concerns. This interest was given immense, nearly
determinative weight by both courts in the abortion cases. 69 In the American
66. Id. at (253, 254) (emphasis added).
67. Id. at (255).
68. Even the German National Ethics Council, which is not bound by constitutional
or legal method, recognized that the balancing method would be brought to bear in a
constitutional analysis of the stem cell issue. GERMAN NATIONAL ETHICS COUNCIL, supra
note 25, at 17 and 21. ("From birth on, moral respect becomes unconditional, and the
right to life is no longer subject to any balancing of considerations or differentiation.")
("[I]t must be possible, in the case of embryos in vitro just as in that of embryos in vivo,
to balance both the moral and the legal precepts of the protection of life against
competing obligations and objects of protection.").
69. See D.A. Jeremy Telman, Abortion and Women's Legal Personhood in
Germany: A Contribution to the Feminist Theory of the State, 24 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
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system a number of constitutional interests seeking to avoid restraints on
human stem cell research might be asserted in the place of a woman's
privacy right, including property7 ° and free speech concerns. 7' Similarly, in
72the German system, the research and scientific communities might assert
rights to occupational freedom,73 property,74 and academic/scientific
freedom.75 Furthermore, individuals suffering from diseases which might be
impacted beneficially by human stem cell research also might assert the right
76to freely develop their personality under the German constitution. None of
these, however, would seem to carry more emotional, not to mention
constitutional, authority than the woman's right to privacy and autonomy.
Even when presented with potentially less weighty constitutional interests
on the side of permitting human stem cell research, there is no reason to
think that the scales in this balancing effort decidedly would tip in favor of
CHANGE 91 (1998). The Supreme Court, in both Roe and Casey, spoke clearly about the
unique burdens confronted by a woman, and a woman only, in pregnancy. This fact gave
the Court pause in considering whether the state could impose upon a woman the
obligation to complete a pregnancy. In Roe, Justice Blackmun wrote: "The detriment that
the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying the choice [for an abortion]
altogether is apparent." Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. In Casey, the plurality expressed the
matter in these terms: "We conclude, however, that the urgent claims of the woman to
retain the ultimate control over her destiny and her body, claims implicit in the meaning
of liberty, require us to [draw a specific rule regarding abortion from what in the
Constitution is but a general standard]." Casey, 505 U.S. at 869. Similarly, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht explained that an exception to the priority given to protecting
unborn life is "justified because.., of the unique relationship between mother and
child.... There are further duties that affect the woman's entire existence: the duty to
carry and bear the child and to care for it many years after its birth." BVerfGE 88, 203
(256).
70. U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V and XIV.
71. U.S. CONST. AMEND. I (incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
72. GERMAN NATIONAL ETHICS COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 6 ("The National Ethics
Council unanimously holds that research on embryonic stem cells touches upon
fundamental values of our society and posses questions as to the subject-matter and scope
of elementary constitutional principles such as human dignity and the protection of life,
as well as scientific freedom.").
73. Art. 12 GG.
74. Art. 16 GG.
75. Art. 5.3 GG. "After all, in the debate on the permissibility of stem cell research,
the legal and moral status of early embryonic life is not the only relevant consideration;
limitation of the freedom of research guaranteed by Article 5(3) of the Basic Law, too,
calls for justification derived from the Constitution itself." GERMAN NATIONAL ETHICS
COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 26.
76. Art. 2.1 GG. See GERMAN NATIONAL ETHICS COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 23.
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protecting the embryo from the destructive derivation process necessary for
human stem cell research. This is so because neither system seems likely to
recognize a protected constitutional interest in life in this context. In the
abortion context, the United States Supreme Court first recognized a state's
compelling interest in protecting the life of the fetus at viability. 77 As the
plurality noted in Casey, through medical and technological advances this
"moment" has been inching backwards since the Court's decision in Roe,
from 28 weeks in 1973 to 24 or 23 weeks in 1992. 78 While this march might
continue to points radically earlier than could have been imagined by Justice
Blackmun thirty years ago when he adopted the viability measure, not to
mention the more contemporary Justices of the Casey plurality from only a
decade ago,79 viability is still far removed from the stage of embryonic
development (around fourteen days, though some researchers would push as
far out as thirty days) at which a standard for stem cell derivation seems to
have settled. 8° The claim that pre-viable embryos should not be credited
with a constitutional interest in life is strengthened by the fact that "at least
one [United States] federal court has found that human embryos lack
standing to bring suit because they are not persons within the meaning of the
Constitution.' 8 1 In the Abortion I case the German Court recognized a much
77. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
78. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992).
79. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, in recognizing this phenomenon,
nonetheless endorse viability as the appropriate standard for triggering the State's interest
in protecting life: "Whenever it may occur, the attainment of viability may continue to
serve as the critical fact, just as it has done since Roe was decided; which is to say that no
change in Roe's factual underpinning has left its central holding obsolete, and none
supports an argument for overruling it." Casey, 505 U.S. at 860.
80. This was the conclusion of the U.K.'s otherwise very liberal Warnock
Commission. See Belew, supra note 10, at 490:
The Wamock Committee ultimately determined that embryonic
experimentation was ethically acceptable up until the appearance of a
primitive streak, which denotes the emergence of unique individualized
characteristics in the embryo and occurs on approximately the fourteenth day
of development. After the fourteenth day of development, the Committee
recommended that further experimentation should be criminally prohibited.
Id. This was also the conclusion of the liberal Clinton-era Human Embryo Research
Panel. Id. at 501 ("Specifically, the panel identified the derivation of human embryos as
ethically appropriate to receive federal funds, while discouraging the use of embryos after
the fourteenth day of development."). The German National Ethics Council defines
derivation as the process of extracting pluripotent stem cells through the destruction of
human embryos "in the first few days of development." See GERMAN NATIONAL ETHICS
COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 4 & 8 (2001).
81. See Belew, supra note 10, at 498-499:
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more broadly conceived protected interest in embryonic life, from as early as
fourteen days following conception. 82 This, however, would make stem cell
derivation occurring prior to the fourteenth day of embryonic development
an act with no implications for a constitutionally protected interest in life.
As noted above, there is considerable acceptance of a fourteen day standard
for derivation.
In Doe v. Shalala, the would-be plaintiff, Mary Doe, was described in the
amended complaint as a "pre-born child in being as a human embryo." She
and another individual with Down's syndrome sought a preliminary
injunction seeking to enjoin the activity of the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) Human Embryo Research Panel on the grounds that Section 101 of the
NIH Revitalization Act of 1993 violated the U.S. Constitution. Their
immediate goal was to forbid the Panel from recommending to the NIH or the
secretary of Health and Human Services that research on human embryos be
supported by federal funding.
Mary Doe was allegedly among more than 20,000 embryos existing in U.S. in
vitro laboratories. After the Revitalization Act passed, the NIH began
receiving applications requesting financial aid for research on human
embryos. During the fall of 1993 and pursuant to the law, a panel was
appointed and charged with preparing a report concerning "moral and ethical
issues raised by the use of human embryos in research" and creating federal
funding "guidelines." Mary Doe sought to block issuance of the report,
which she argued would deprive her and others like her "of life and liberty
without due process of law, subject them to cruel and unusual punishment,
and deprive them of their right to privacy."
The court held, in part, that Mary Doe lacked standing to litigate her claims
because she was not a person recognized by the Constitution. The court
stated that putting "philosophical and religious considerations aside, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that the word 'person,' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn."
Since Roe did not assign a precise moral or legal status to fetal life, one
commentator has argued that the "decision... still leave[s] it to the legislative
branch to determine whether embryos can be killed in the name of scientific
progress."
Id.
82. BVerfGE 39, 1 (37).
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CONCLUSION
If the precise outcome of the balancing to be carried out by the American
and German constitutional courts in the stem cell context is not obvious, the
balancing method itself promises one clear result: the absolutist claims of
those who argue for the protection of "embryonic life," just like claims for
the significance of scientific research dependent upon human stem cells, are
to be rejected as imperatives. 83  As Aleinikoff explains: "Balancing
suggest[s] a particularistic, case-by-case, common law approach that
accommodate[s] gradual change and reject[s] absolutes." 84
As a constitutional matter, the German National Ethics Council assessed
the stem cell issue in exactly these terms:
Neither a right to protection of dignity nor a right to "absolute"
protection of life for this early embryonic life can be derived from
Article 1(1) and the first sentence of Article 2(2) of the German
Basic Law (Constitution). The contrary view not only mixes up the
guarantee element of these two provisions, but also, in particular,
disregards the central question of the subject of the relevant
rights-that is, the conditions that must be satisfied in order fully
to enjoy the right to the protection of life or, as the case may be, of
dignity. On closer examination, the postulate of an "absolute"
protection of life for early embryos based on considerations of
human dignity proves to be an impermissible circular argument
that lacks any foundation in the Constitution....
The promise that neither side of an intensely debated social question is
likely to be wholly vindicated, and the fact that such a society persists in
spite of this, is inherent to the "identity" and "difference" of
constitutionalism. Balancing such claims as a method of constitutional
interpretation, perhaps better than other methods, is particularly well suited
to reconciling differences and reinforcing identity. I think this process says
much more about the really important things the United States and Germany
share in common than do the divergent outcomes of any specific balancing
exercise. In fact, the balancing method is merely the
manifestation in legal studies of a [broad] intellectual movement
that dominated the first half of the twentieth century. Darwinism,
non-Euclidean geometry, and relativity theory had shaken the
foundation of formalism in the traditional sciences; the impact in
the social sciences was dramatic. Universals, logically deduced
83. See GERMAN NATIONAL ETHICS COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 7.
84. Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 961 (emphasis added).
85. GERMAN NATIONAL ETHICS COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 7.
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from fixed categories, gave way to culturally-based, small 't'
truths.
86
Perhaps this is what Kagan means when he begrudgingly concedes that "the
United States and Europe share a set of common Western beliefs.
'8 7
86. Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 969.
87. KAGAN, supra note 6, at 103.
